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Introduction
As presented in Chapter 1, there are a number of indirect causes of land-use change 
which operate diffusely. Agrimonde-Terra decided to consider the ’global context’ as a 
driver of change in the land use and food security system. Three forces were identified 
in the global context: (a) governance, i.e. political factors, alliances between actors and 
policies, (b) economic development and resources, i.e. economic growth and inequalities, 
energy mix, international trade, research and innovation, and (c) human development, 
i.e. demography, education, culture and ethics.
In this chapter, we first present a number of past and on-going trends as well as uncertainties 
that have been identified at the global level relative to these three forces, and look at 
their influence on land use and food security. Then, we describe the hypotheses for 2050 
relative to the global context, which have been built by the Agrimonde-Terra team and 
discussed with the Scenario Advisory Committee.
Upon the recommendation of this Committee, the five “alternative pathways of future societal 
development, described as shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs)” (O’Neill et al., 2017) 
prepared by the climate change research community were not adopted for two reasons. First, 
they were developed for another purpose as their ultimate goal was “to produce integrated 
scenarios that will indeed include socioeconomic and environmental conditions as affected 
by both climate change and climate policy” (O’Neill et al., 2014, p. 389). They describe future 
conditions that are relevant for adaptation and mitigation of climate change whereas the 
Agrimonde-Terra’s hypotheses are about the global context for land use and food security. 
Second, at the time of the development of the Agrimonde-Terra’s hypotheses relative to the 
global context, the concept of SSPs had started to be developed (O’Neill et al., 2014) but 
the elements of the SSPs were not yet precise and assumptions were not yet published.
Governance
Fukuyama (2013) defines governance as “a government’s ability to make and enforce 
rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not” 
27. The authors thank Denis Lacroix for his comments on this chapter.
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(p.348). Governments are therefore the major actors involved in the governance of the land 
use and food security system. However, a number of other institutions, such as international 
and regional organizations and initiatives, private companies, NGOs and philanthropic 
associations, as well as citizens, are also active. Alliances between these actors are formed 
and rivalries for power exist. They frame access to land, as well as the priorities for policies, 
public investments, and regulations related to land, to the environment and climate change, 
to agricultural production and food processing, and to diets.
❚❚ Political instability and conflicts in the poorest regions 
of the world 
While a number of countries have improved the governance of their land over the past 
40 years, a great number of countries remain unstable, subject to frequent coups d’état, 
protracted conflicts and corruption. They are unable and/or not ready to effectively govern 
on land use and food security issues. During this period, the number of member countries 
of the United Nations has grown from 149 to 193, some of them as a result of the division 
of countries.28 There has also been a rise in the number of inter-ethnic conflicts, terrorism 
and piracy activities. Armed violence is resulting in the death of many civilians, or their 
displacement and migration, and their lack of access to land and food. In 2017, the World 
Bank believed that two billion people lived in countries where development outcomes were 
affected by fragility, conflict and violence.29 Natural resources are rarely the sole cause of 
conflicts, but land is implicated in all phases of conflicts, from the outbreak of violence 
to the resolution, and conflicts lead to land degradation, deforestation, the decrease in 
cultivated areas and production, and migration. Non-controlled areas are home to illicit 
trade and armed rebels. In the future, demographic growth, climate change, economic 
instability and tensions over resources will contribute to the increase in political instability 
and concentration of fragility in areas where multiple vulnerabilities intersect; a protracted 
’ecosystemic crisis’ impacting several generations and causing irreversible damage will 
develop (Maietta et al., 2017). Such crises are already taking place in the Lake Chad 
Basin, the Ganges Delta and the Aral Sea. Also, whereas in the past rich countries have 
contributed to the extraction of resources in fragile areas, in the future they could face 
significant tensions due to political instability in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.
❚❚ Globalization, integration, national sovereignty and local 
governance
From a political and economic point of view, an increasing number of countries are hesitating 
between integration and national sovereignty. There is also increased demand for recognition 
of governance at more local levels, be they cities or territories (Caron et al., 2017).
28.  http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-present/
index.html (accessed 21 September 2017).
29.  http://ida.worldbank.org/theme/conflict-and-fragility (accessed 21 September 2017).
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Global governance is promoted by a number of specialized United Nations (UN) agencies and 
other international institutions and programmes. The relationships between international 
institutions and countries are complex. On the one hand, States are members of the 
UN agencies and other international institutions. States participate in collective work 
and finance international institutions. However, in the past 20 years, core funding by 
countries has been decreasing and earmarked contributions have grown. International 
institutions are now financed with hybrid arrangements that weaken them and lead to a 
fragmentation of their strategies (Jenks and Topping, 2016). On the other hand, a number 
of agencies can impose their point of view on countries and even challenge the authority 
of governments. In some cases, domestic policies are influenced by the recommendations 
and funding of these international institutions. In other cases, countries do not take into 
account the recommendations of these reports, or there is a long time span between the 
publication of the report or the signature of the agreement and the implementation of a 
policy. While the world was alerted about the limits of resources 45 years ago (Meadows 
et al., 1972), sustainable development became an objective 30 years ago (Brundtland, 
1987), the first global report on climate change (IPCC) was written 26 years ago and the 
first Conference of Parties on Climate Change was held 21 years ago, these have not yet 
radically modified the policies of most governments, the strategies of many enterprises, 
and the attitudes of most farmers and citizens towards resources (Box 6.1 for other major 
events in the global governance of land use and food security). It is now widely recognized 
that international institutions need reforms and there are uncertainties about their future 
capacity to govern and provide strategic directions.
Historically, regional governance has been based on geographical proximity. Countries 
decided to cooperate for their mutual security, e.g. the European Union and ASEAN. 
However, trans-national cooperation is now essentially driven by trade. The development of 
information and communication technologies increases the importance of shared interests 
or ideology and regional entities can now link cities or territories. Over the past two decades, 
the world has become increasingly multipolar and no State currently seems able to find 
a solution to conflicts or impose its view of the world. In the future, regional governance 
could become more amorphous, of a pop-up nature. Initiatives could be set up to pursue 
particular purposes and these will be easily disbanded. However, regional cooperation 
could emerge from people engaging in social and cultural exchange (Jarrar, 2016).
The concept of ’sovereignty’ is used in law, political philosophy and geopolitics. It 
relies on the idea that entities are impenetrable to one another and are, for that reason, 
delineated by precise boundaries that define their identity (Latour, 2016). On the one 
hand, sovereignty is used at the national level to defend the Nation State, national 
values and protectionism, as well as by groups who share the same ethnic, religious, 
linguistic or other cultural categories to claim some form of independence. On the other 
hand, sovereignty is challenged by global issues such as climate change (Latour, 2016).
Also, over the past 30 years, cities and territories have become geographical scales in which 
new types of governance are developing. Elinor Ostrom (2011) considered that territories 
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Box 6.1. Some major events in the global governance of land use and food security.
1945 FAO: creation of the Food and Agriculture Organization
1961 World Food Programme is created because of concern about potential world food 
shortage.
1963 FAO and WHO: creation of the Codex Alimentarius Commission for harmonized interna-
tional food standards to protect the health of consumers and ensure fair trade practices
1964-67 GATT: Kennedy round  Wheat Trade Convention (WTC) and Food Aid Convention (FAC)
1972 Club of Rome: publication of ’Limits to growth’
1973-79 GATT’s Tokyo round: increased trade liberalization but modest agreement on agriculture
1973 First recognized world food crisis  creation of Committee on Food Security (CFS)
1979 FAO: World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development
Brundtland Report on environment and development
1990 IPCC First Assessment Report
1992 Rio Earth Summit
Convention on Biological Diversity
1994 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)
1986-94 GATT’s Uruguay round: agreement on agriculture, limiting domestic support and export 
subsidies, prohibiting non-tariff import restrictions, and establishing special and diffe-
rential treatment for developing countries
1995 WTO: creation of World Trade Organization
First Conference of Parties (COP 1) on Climate Change
1996 FAO: “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access 
to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food prefe-
rences for an active and healthy life”
2000 Adoption of the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
2001-05 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA)
WTO’s Doha round: negotiations on agriculture
2005-08 International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for 
Development (IAASTD)
2008 United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation (REDD)
2012 FAO – CFS: Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, 
Fisheries, and Forests in the context of National Food Security
2013 WTO’s Bali package: agreement to negotiate a permanent solution to public stockholding 
for food security purposes, call for more transparency in tariff quota administration, expan-
sion of the list of General Services and declaration to reduce all forms of export subsidies
2015 WTO’s Nairobi package: elimination of agricultural export subsidies by developed countries, 
except for a handful of agricultural products; developing countries have longer periods 
to do so.
2016 World Forum on Access to Land and Natural Resources
Adoption of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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are a prime area for applying new governance processes situated somewhere between 
collective action and public action, and at the interface between the State and markets.
As far as land is concerned, there is no global governance or international convention 
related to the issue because “land is seen as too politically sensitive or too technically 
complicated to lend itself to meaningful resolution” (UN Interagency Framework Team 
for Preventive Action, 2012). Nevertheless, ’Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food 
Security’ (FAO, 2012) were developed through a broad partnership of international, 
regional and national organizations. They outline principles and practices that 
governments can refer to when making laws and administering land, fisheries and forest 
rights. Further, a World Forum on Access to Land was held in 2016 at the initiative of 
associations. Land governance is mostly conducted at national level. However, there is 
also the promotion of land governance at the territorial level as well as ’terroir’ or origin-
linked products. As far as food security is concerned, a large number of institutions are 
active on the issue but “none has the authority and legitimacy to take responsibility 
for all aspects or to coordinate the various institutions and manage potential conflicts” 
(Fouilleux et al., 2017).
❚❚ Changes in the role of governments
Traditionally, governments have three main responsibilities: “To provide goods and 
services (e.g., education and health care); regulate the interactions within society 
and the economy; and redistribute income (e.g., through the tax and transfer system). 
Among many other responsibilities, governments are also responsible for managing 
risks, ensuring fairness in society, fighting corruption and protecting the environment. 
To finance these activities, governments raise money in the form of revenues (e.g., 
taxation) and/or through borrowing” (OECD, 2017). Over recent decades, a number of 
countries have made efforts to transform the management of their public sector, for 
example, by promoting the adoption of private sector practices, reducing the costs of 
the public sector, transferring traditional public sector responsibilities to the private 
sector or to decentralized services, developing a culture of performance, evaluation 
and impact, encouraging holistic strategies and coordinated actions etc. Evidence of 
declining public trust has also been seen for some time in declining voter turnouts, the 
growing appeal of populist and extremist ideologies in some regions and, above all, in 
negative perceptions of the government as an institution prone to corruption (Bertucci, 
2006). For the future, major uncertainties are related to the capacity of governments 
to regain trust, to decrease debts and adjust budgets to new expenses, and to adapt 
to the digital age.
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❚❚ Policies: From Millennium Development Goals to Sustainable 
Development Goals and land use policies
The evolution from the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) through to the 17 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) represents an important change in the global 
governance of development issues (Box 6.1). The eight MDGs emanated from UN Summits 
and Conferences of the 1990s and were endorsed in the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration of 8 September, 2000. They formed a blueprint for action agreed by all 
of the world’s countries and leading development institutions to eradicate poverty, 
illiteracy, hunger, discrimination against women, unsafe drinking water and degraded 
environment. They reflected widespread public concern about the issues and marked a 
historic and effective method of global mobilization (Sachs, 2012). During the MDG era, 
the number of hungry people in the world declined but “much of humanity’s progress 
has come at a considerable cost to the environment. High-input, resource-intensive 
farming has contributed to deforestation, water scarcity, soil depletion and high levels 
of greenhouse gas emissions” (FAO, 2017a, p. 14).
Beginning in 2016, 17 SDGs and 169 targets to wipe out poverty, fight inequality and 
tackle climate change over the next 15 years were adopted. The SDGs mark some 
changes in global governance because they were developed after wide consultation with 
people from all sectors of society. The notion of developed and developing countries 
has changed – Brazil, India, and China are increasingly influential in global politics – 
and connections between places have rapidly developed. The SDGs do not focus on 
the end goal alone, but also on the means used to achieve it. There is recognition that 
natural resources (including land use), food and livelihoods cannot be looked upon 
separately. Interconnections between the goals are recognized and taken into account. 
There is an attempt to break the ’silos approach’ as well as the lack of coordination 
between sectors and policies, which means that governments will need to have a more 
holistic and coherent approach to problems and will need to monitor and evaluate 
policies (OECD, 2017). All countries – whether they are upper, middle or low income – 
are concerned by the SDGs and have to make tangible improvements to the lives of 
their citizens. There are uncertainties about delivering the SDGs by 2030, globally and 
in particular countries. It will depend on many factors, such as the ability to connect 
local innovation capacity with global parameters (Leach et al., 2012), to break the silos 
in government actions, to make stakeholders accountable and to find the necessary 
financial resources.
In relation to these goals, there has been an evolution in the ’measure’ of governance. 
Starting in the early 1990s, expert thinking in the international development community 
focused on the concept of ’good governance’ with the expectation of a strong positive 
correlation with improved economic performance. Large investments were made to 
improve public administration and transparency and broaden democratic participation. 
However, there was a progressive realization that policy bottlenecks and political 
conflicts that impede good governance are complex and could not be easily resolved. 
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Three aspects of governance are now increasingly considered: good governance (the 
processes of decision-making and their institutional foundations), effective governance 
(the capacity of countries to pursue sustainable development) and equitable governance 
(distributive outcomes) (Bierman et al., 2014). Also, official development assistance 
(ODA) which used to encourage convergence between less and more developed 
economies is increasingly focused on protecting global public goods and on delivering 
SDGs (Severino and Ray, 2009). It is confronted with the interventions of a variety of 
new actors, especially large private foundations and the private sector, as well as local 
interventions.
❚❚ Growing role of large corporations in global governance
There is a great variety of enterprises in the world, both formal and informal. There 
are an estimated 125 million formal micro-small-medium enterprises (Kushnir et al., 
2010) and 100,000 multinational enterprises (MNEs) and among the latter, 1,500 are 
State-owned MNEs which own more than 86,000 foreign affiliates (UNCTAD, 2017). 
Large corporations – industrial, financial and service companies – are major political, 
economic, environmental and cultural forces in the world. Until the end of Cold War, 
most multinational corporations focused their strategies on influencing home and host 
governments and policies (Gilpin, 1975). Since then, many countries have introduced 
policies to attract potential investors. Information technologies and management 
capacities have allowed firms to maximize efficiencies, to set up global supply chain 
across countries, to improve productivity and also to gain bargaining power vis-à-vis 
governments (Detomasi, 2007). As these companies benefit from the lack of fiscal 
coordination between countries and “play by the rules they are given” (Reich, 2008), 
they often pay as little tax as possible and can endanger Nation States’ sources of 
revenue. They are accountable only to their own self-selected boards and “rationalize 
their actions as necessary to address market failures” (Birn, 2014), and promote new 
technologies, innovation, and management techniques. The influence of MNEs and of 
their affiliates on global governance is also found in the public-private partnerships they 
form. Furthermore, over the past decade, private companies and their philanthropic 
branches, foundations and trusts are increasingly implicated in the humanitarian sector 
as funders and direct implementers (Maietta et al., 2017).
Agro-industrial, trading and food processing companies, alongside large supermarkets and 
digital companies, as well as investments funds, are major actors in the global land use 
and food security system. In past decades, they have provided modern inputs, technology, 
machinery and skills to modernize production techniques, which have contributed to 
higher yields, resistance to pests and diseases, easier work for farmers and increased 
food availability. However, over time, they have also contributed to the specialization and 
standardization of production, and the use of inputs which may have negative impacts 
on soils, water and health. They have led to a homogenization of cultivated varieties, 
reduction in the use of local varieties and their exchange, increased erosion of biological 
diversity, heavy debts for farmers and market dependence. Private companies are the main 
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large-scale buyers of land, followed by stock exchange-listed companies and investment 
funds (Nolte et al., 2016). These companies promote “both productionist and productivist 
visions of food security. They are organized globally and offer global technical solutions 
for a problem presented as a global one, using food security as a justification for their 
business by citing the need to increase productivity levels to feed nine billion people” 
(Fouilleux et al., 2017, p.11). They have contributed to improved access to food and 
nutrition transition (Chapter 8).
❚❚ Global activism by civil society groups 
A great variety of NGOs, civil-society groups, churches and faith-based organizations, 
producers’ and consumers’ associations are involved in global governance, including 
land use and food security issues. They gain access to political arenas. As far as land 
is concerned, there are NGOs which are influential at international level (e.g., La Via 
Campesina, the Farmer Network, COPA-COGECA in the European Union, Agricultural 
Producers’ Organizations of West Africa – ROPPA) and some of them strongly oppose 
productivism and agribusinesses. Other groups concentrate on the rights of indigenous 
populations on their land. As far as food security is concerned, the approach of these 
groups is “to re-politicize the debate by asking questions about how food is produced 
and by whom” (Fouilleux et al., 2017, p. 13). A number of associations and NGOs actively 
campaign to influence political and economic actors and their strategies. NGOs, for 
example, have played a key role in shaping new private regulatory schemes that have 
emerged (Busch, 2007).
❚❚ Development of alliances between a wide variety of actors 
A number of alliances of public and private actors are formed. For example, there are 
alliances of public and private actors that “interact with traditional public forms of land 
use regulation, leading to ’hybrid’ interventions” (Lambin et al., 2014, p. 129). Their 
interventions can take the form of instruments such as “eco-certification, geographical 
indications, commodity round tables, moratoria, and payments for environmental 
services” (Lambin et al., 2014). There are many other examples, too. For instance, 
environmental performance standards and standards for socially responsible production 
are established by NGOs and industry associations (Gulbrandsen, 2012). Non-State 
actors “such as mining companies, conservation NGOs, consultants, scientists and 
foreign aid donors” influence the State in order to control and secure forests for wealth 
generation or biodiversity conservation (Corson, 2011). The ’New Alliance for Food 
Security and Nutrition’ has been formed by G8 countries led by the USA, several African 
governments and transnational corporations and aims to facilitate foreign investment 
in Africa without any obligations to protect local farmers. Another example is social 
networking, which enables citizens to coalesce and leads to open, participatory and 
peer-driven power (Heimans and Timms, 2014).
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Economic development and resources
❚❚ Global economic growth and structural transformation of 
economies
The global per capita GDP has increased almost five-fold in the 20th century and tripled 
over the past 30 years with the average global GDP/capita (in constant 2010 US $) climbing 
from $3,800 (1961) to $9,516 (2010) and 10,283 (2015).30 Global employment grew at an 
average annual rate of 1.7% between 1991 and 2007, but since then employment growth 
has slowed to 1.2% per annum. For the future, there are questions about the evolution 
of the economy, and unemployment could continue to rise as the labour force expands 
(ILO, 2015).
The sectoral and spatial distribution of economic activities has also changed. According 
to UNIDO (2013), in developing countries, the percentage of GDP originating in agriculture 
was 37% in 1950, 21% in 1980 and 16% in 2005. The percentage of GPD originating in 
manufacturing rose from 12% in 1950 to around 17% in 1980 and 15% in 2005 (UNIDO, 2013). 
In advanced countries, the percentage of GDP originating in agriculture fell from 16% in 1950 
to 4% in 1980 and 2% in 2005. The percentage originating in manufacturing fell from 23% in 
1980 to 16% in 2005. For services, the percentage climbed from 60% in 1980 to 71% in 2005. 
However, manufacturing and agriculture still play a major role in employment. According to 
ILO modelled estimates starting in 1991, at this date 43.4% of the world’s population was 
employed in agriculture, 23.7% in industry and 42.1% in services; in 2015, the estimates 
were 27.2% for employment in agriculture, 24.1% in industry, and 42.1% in services. The 
decrease in the percentage of the population employed in agriculture has been particularly 
high in South East Asia and the Pacific, in Eastern Asia and Latin America. In 2015, the 
percentage of the population employed in agriculture was about 57.6% in sub-Saharan 
Africa, 29% in Northern Africa, 33.3% in South East Asia and the Pacific, 18.5% in Eastern 
Asia, 14.2% in Latin America and the Caribbean, 4.5% in European Union 28, and 1.7% in 
Northern America. In the future, agricultural employment, like the other economic sectors, 
could change due to the development of automation technologies.
Productivity gaps between agriculture and other sectors can contribute to an explanation 
of the differences between countries in agriculture’s contribution to GDPs and employment 
shares. These gaps are mainly related to the levels of technology currently applied in 
the agricultural sector: “At the global level, agricultural work remains largely manual 
and mechanization is limited. As a result, agricultural productivity has been decoupled 
from other types of activities, resulting in lower agricultural incomes, which are also 
impacted by changes in relative prices between agricultural and non-agricultural goods. 
The consequence is that the value added of other sectors rises much faster than in the 
30.  https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?page=6. 
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agricultural sector, which, nevertheless, continues to employ a significant proportion of 
the working population. Given the importance of agriculture in rural areas, these processes 
explain the income gap between towns and the countryside and account for the broad 
extent of rural poverty” (Losch, 2016, p. 7).
Also, since the 1970s, policies have been liberalized, there has been a greater concentration 
of assets and a growing role for financial markets. This includes deregulation for banks 
and equity funds and rapid financial innovation (Crotty, 2009) which have contributed to 
economic growth but also to growing debts for all economic actors and a major financial 
crisis in 2007-08. In the mid-2015, the total global debt-to-GDP ratio is significantly higher 
than it was before the 2008 crisis. Whereas advanced economies got indebted before the 
2008 crisis, in emerging and developing countries aggregate debt levels have increased 
sharply since that period and represent a major risk for the future (WEF, 2018). The debt 
level of enterprises and governments has also increased (WEF, 2018). These processes have 
major impacts on agriculture and the rural economy in developing countries, especially 
off-farm diversification and on-farm specialization (Losch et al., 2012). Also, new financial 
models for agriculture are being developed (Kloeppinger-Todd and Sharma, 2010). Banks 
and investment funds are increasingly engaging in commodity and farmland investments, 
and conventional agrifood firms are acting like financial institutions (Clapp et al., 2016). 
Land is increasingly considered a financial asset, and that could impact the land market 
dynamics (Fairbairn, 2014; Ducastel and Anseeuw, 2017). Food chains are increasingly 
managed to facilitate mass production and standardization, and the development of trade 
(McCullough et al., 2008; Rastoin and Ghersi, 2010). Nevertheless, a variety of agrifood 
systems remain (Fournier and Touzard, 2017) (Chapter 8).
❚❚ Income and wealth disparity 
Per capita income has diverged across countries for decades, but since the 1990s and in 
particular since the 2000s, there is evidence of convergence at the global level (UN-DESA, 
2015). The convergence between rich and poor countries has been driven by Asian 
countries, first China and India, and now the whole Asian region. However, in East Asia, 
widening income inequality gaps between inhabitants of rural and urban areas have been 
linked to higher incomes associated with good education and rapid industrialization. Over 
the past decade, income growth has been seen in Latin American and the Caribbean. 
Africa and Oceania have hardly contributed to global convergence. Nevertheless, the top 
richest 1% in the world has more wealth than the rest of the world combined (Piketty, 
2013) and sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia account for more than 80% of the world’s 
poor. Almost three-fifths of the world’s extreme poor are concentrated in five densely 
populated countries: Bangladesh, China, the Democratic Republic of Congo, India and 
Nigeria.31 In all regions of the world inequality in income distribution within countries 
31.  https://globalmillennials.org/poverty 
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compels some citizens to live in poverty. In OECD member states, since the 2007-2008 
recession, inequality levels are at their highest since data collection started (OECD, 2015). 
The same trend is observed across many countries across the world.
❚❚ Production: energy and water use, and digital transformation
Wood and later coal, oil and natural gas have played an enormous role in the development 
of society. Nuclear energy, renewable sources of energy (hydroelectric, solar, wind and 
biomass) and non-conventional hydrocarbons started to play a role much later. Global 
energy consumption has grown rapidly over the past 40 years in response to economic 
development and demographic growth, especially in emerging economies such as China 
and India. The future availability of fossil fuels (especially oil and natural gas) and their 
impacts on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are leading to major questions about the 
means to reduce their production and use (Stern, 2006). Fossil fuels are used in many 
agricultural and food processing activities, such as mechanization, irrigation, drying and 
cooking, and the production of fertilizers and herbicides. Smith et al. (2007) have estimated 
that agriculture accounted for 10-12% of total global anthropogenic GHG emissions, and 
that agricultural CH4 and N2O emissions increased by nearly 17% from 1990 to 2005.
Biomass energy includes garbage, wood, landfill gases and biofuels. First-generation 
biofuels are produced from traditional food and feed crops. World biofuel production 
grew five-fold between 2001 and 2011 but is still a minor source of energy. However, its 
efficiency, impact on land and forest use, food prices and GHG emissions remain very 
controversial. The steepest rise in biofuel production occurred in 2007-2008, concomitantly 
with a sharp rise in food commodity prices (HLPE, 2013), quickly followed by food riots 
in the cities of many developing countries. Research is currently being conducted on the 
development of second-generation biofuels produced from various sources of biomass 
which do not directly compete with food and feed crops and whose production is more 
efficient (Guyomard et al., 2011).
Water is used in industry and mining, in agriculture (including for livestock), in households, 
but also for energy production and ecosystems’ livelihood. The first three uses of water 
have grown much faster than population growth over the last forty years. In 1960, 2,000 km3 
of water were used every year; since 2000, the annual consumption of water is about 
4,000 km3 (see Aquastat32), which is more than capacities of renewal. Around 20% of total 
water used globally is from ground water resources (renewable or not), and this share 
is rising rapidly, particularly in dry areas. At global level, the withdrawal ratios are 69% 
agricultural, 12% municipal and 19% industrial. However, a large percentage of water 
withdrawn by agriculture is consumed by vapor-transpiration whereas the industry or 
domestic uses restitute most of the water they use. Agricultural use is the highest in Asia 
(81% in 2010) and the lowest in Europe (25%). Over the years, uses of water by agriculture 
32.  http://www.fao.org/NR/WATER/AQUASTAT/water_use/indexfra.stm 
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and industry have become a major source of pollution of groundwater, watercourses and 
soils. Water resources have become a real political and economic issue for governments 
of emerging and developing countries, and a major source of potential conflicts.
Over the past two decades, automation and digitalization have had an impact on production 
in all economic sectors as well as on patterns of consumption (less ownership and more 
pay-per-use) and partnerships. Agriculture and the food industry are quickly entering the 
era of platform economics. Some digital platforms are a meeting place for farmers and 
consumers (short supply chains), for distributors and farmers (for inputs, spare parts or 
small farming equipment), for the sharing of equipment, for promoting local production 
and combating waste, for crowdfunding etc. In the future, data and intelligence could be 
at the centre of business models; data qualification, ownership and security will become 
crucial, including for land use and food processing.
❚❚ Changes in trade 
International trade in goods and services has gone from about 124 billion US$ in 1960, 
to 4 trillion US$ in 1995, to 24 trillion US$ in 2014, and has slightly declined since, which 
may be a sign a diminishing interdependence and integration between countries (UNCTAD, 
2015b). At the same time there has been the development of (a) a multilateral trading 
system promoting liberalization, elimination of tariffs and quotas, but also facilitating 
the development of non-tariff trade barriers such as the Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(SPS) agreement, Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreement and the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Intellectual Property (TRIPs) (Box 6.1); and (b) preferential and regional 
trade agreements and international trade corridors; these were traditionally in Europe 
and North America, but have shifted to the Asia-Pacific region. Also, there has been 
the development of Fair Trade, which seeks to re-engineer value chains between small 
producers in developing countries and buyers, in order that a greater proportion of the 
overall rents accrue to those who provide the inputs (Nicholls and Huybrechts, 2017). 
Trade is a key element in land-use changes and food security strategies, a driver of 
changes in ecosystems (Pace and Gephart, 2017) as well as a vector for the introduction 
of alien species (Hulme, 2009). Perceptions of future food and resource limitation are 
causing changes in trade (Pace and Gephart, 2017), especially as structural production 
surpluses have nearly disappeared and there are no more big players with large stocks 
(Daviron and Douillet, 2013).
Global agricultural trade has grown much slower than trade in other products. Farm 
products accounted for more than 30% of all merchandise traded globally until 1960, but 
since the early 2000s, its share has averaged less than 9% (Anderson, 2010). The value 
of global agricultural exports nearly tripled between 2000 and 2012, while agricultural 
exports increased by about 60% in volume terms over the same period (FAO, 2015a). The 
geography of agricultural trade is changing quickly (Daviron and Douillet, 2013). In Asia, 
imports as a share of apparent consumption increased regularly between 1960 and 2004 
(from 4% to 14%) (Anderson, 2010) and Asia has become the fastest growing net importer 
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since then, driven especially by China, South East Asia and India. The Latin American share 
of agricultural production was stable (around 25%) between 1960 and 2004 (Anderson, 
2010) but over the past decade, Latin America has become the largest net exporter of 
food, with significant production growth outstripping sustained consumption growth (FAO, 
2015a). North America was the second largest net exporter but has lost its domination. 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia are shifting from being net importers to becoming net 
exporters (FAO, 2015a). Sub-Saharan Africa’s net imports have been growing as food 
production is unable to keep pace with growing population and demand.
❚❚ Research and innovation: growing role of the private sector 
Over the past 40 years, scientific breakthroughs and technological and organizational 
innovations have fuelled substantial gains to the economy, and they are continuing to 
do so to the point that experts say that we are on the brink of a technological revolution 
that will fundamentally alter the way we live, work, and relate to one another. Agriculture 
and food systems have been transformed by technological advances in material and life 
sciences which have led to major improvements, for example, genetic engineering, vaccines 
for livestock, Integrated Pest Management (IPM), minimum tillage systems, geographical 
information systems, and robotic systems.
In the agri-food sector, research and development in the public and the private sectors 
contributed to major gains in agricultural productivity in industrial countries after World 
War II, and to the spread of the Green Revolution beginning in the 1960s, allowing food 
output to more than keep pace with demand. Over the years, the geographical distribution 
of Agricultural Research and Development (Ag R&D) has changed. The governments of 
middle-income nations are now investing more in agriculture research than those in high-
income ones, and the gap between spending by high-income and low-income countries 
is widening. Rich countries accounted for 56% of global public sector spending on Ag 
R&D in 1960, but only 47% in 2011 (Pardey et al., 2016). Globally, private sector spending 
on agricultural research and development is catching up with public sector spending. 
“In 2011, an average of 52.5% of the research on crop breeding, informatics, fertilizers, 
pesticides and food technologies in rich countries was being done by private firms (in 
1980, the figure was 42%). For middle-income countries, the private proportion of domestic 
spending was 37% in 2011 (up from 19% in 1980). Middle-income countries’ share of private 
AgR&D spending in 2011 was 35.5%, up from close to 16% in 1980” (Pardey et al., 2016, 
p. 302). The growing role of the private sector means that intellectual property rights in 
agriculture, such as plant patents, plant breeders’ rights, utility patents, trade secrets, 
trademarks and geographical indicators, are going to play a major role and influence who 
will benefit from the research. It also means that the pursuit of public research leading 
to common goods and the capacity of governments to fund public research are going to 
be major challenges in the future (Piesse and Thirtle, 2010).
Furthermore, for many decades, society in richer countries has had total confidence in 
the capacity of science and technology (S&T) to overcome many problems. This situation 
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is changing because S&T now involves diverse sets of actors which leads to a complex 
distribution of power and struggles over which directions should be taken (EFS, 2013). 
Youth interest in science is declining and budget constraints are triggering tensions about 
the governance of science and technology. The perceptions of S&T’s impacts on society 
and the environment are increasingly diverse.
Human development
❚❚ Demography: concentration of population growth in Asia 
and Africa
The world’s population almost quadrupled in the twentieth century, rising from 1.6 to 
6 billion people. More precisely, it has gone from 3 billion in 1960 to 6.96 billion in 2010, 
and in 2016, the world population reached about 7.4 billion.33 The global population 
growth rate is declining: this growth rate was 2.1% in the 1960s and 1.2% in the 2010s. 
In 2016, Asia represented about 59.7% of the world’s population (55.2% in 1950), Africa 
accounted for 16.4% (9.1% in 1950), OECD countries for 15.3% (29% in 1950) and Latin 
America and the Caribbean for 8.6% (6.7% in 1950). The growth of the population is 
therefore concentrated in Africa and Asia.
The average annual rate of change of the urban population has tended to decrease at 
world’s level: 2.99% for the period 1960-1965, down to 2.20% for the period 2005-2010, 
and 2.05% for the period 2010-2015. It is decreasing in all regions of the world, including 
Africa where it remains however very high (3.55% for the period 2010-2015) and Asia (2.5% 
for the period 2010-2015). The average annual rate of growth of the rural population in 
less developed regions has fallen drastically (from 0.72% in 1960-1965 to 0.21% in 2010-
2015), but in sub-Saharan Africa it has remained very high (2% for the period 1960-1965 
and 1.86% for the period 2010-2015).
As a share of the world’s population, international migration is increasing slightly faster 
than the world’s population. International migration represents 3% of all people today, 
compared with 2.6% in 1960, according to United Nations statistics. South-South migration 
flows (i.e. across developing countries) are growing compared to South-North movements 
(from developing to developed countries) (UN-DESA, 2017). The vast majority of refugees 
are hosted in Asian and African countries (UN-DESA, 2017). Out-migration from rural 
regions is also a major trend that leads to a decrease in rural labour. Once they get out 
of rural areas or move across borders, many migrants send money (remittances) back 
to families in their countries of origin; the overall annual flow of such remittances has 
nearly tripled since 2000 (Connor et al., 2013). Remittances help to make vulnerable 
communities more resilient to shocks (Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2011); they give receiving 
33.  https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/ 
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groups the capacity to opt for more risky or costly agricultural choices. Migrations from 
rural areas can lead to labour shortages and therefore to shifts to less labour-intensive 
practices (Mendola, 2008; Radel et al., 2010) or to adoption of monoculture practices 
(Schmook and Radel, 2008).
Unprecedented changes are occurring worldwide as fertility and mortality rates decline in 
most countries and the population ages (236 million people over 60 in 1960; 769 million 
in 2010, and 969 million in 2015). According to the United Nations Population Fund, the 
proportion of people aged 60-plus is already higher in less developed regions than in 
developed regions; it is rising at a fast pace in the developed regions which have little 
time to adjust to the adverse impacts of ageing. The youth (ages 10 to 24) constitutes 
more than 1.8 billion of the world’s population and is at its highest ever level; 226 million 
youth aged 15-24 live in Africa and represent 19% of the global youth. For Africa, youth 
represents both an opportunity and a challenge: they need to be educated and employed, 
fed in a healthy fashion and cared for, but they are also full of energy, creativity and talents.
The levels of development have improved all over the world. UNDP (2016) reports 
that “every developing region’s Human Development Index (HDI) value has increased 
considerably between 1990 and 2015, although progress has been slowing since 2010. 
This reflects important advances not only in income, but also in health and education. 
Between 1990 and 2010, the aggregate HDI value of the least developed countries increased 
by 46%.” (UNDP, 2016, p. 26). The global extreme poverty rate (1.90 $ a day) has fallen 
from 60% in 1990 to 3.5% in 2013 in East Asia and the Pacific, and from 44% to 15% in 
South Asia during the same period (UNDP, 2016).
❚❚ Persistence of global divide in education and gender inequity
Since the 1970s, there has been a strong focus on primary school enrolment in developing 
countries and secondary school enrolment has also progressed. Nevertheless, a great divide 
remains between the poorest and richest countries: in 2010, about 33% of the population 
over the age of 15 had no schooling in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa and 23.8% in the 
Middle East and North Africa (Barro and Lee, 2010). However, significant progress has been 
made by developing countries in terms of reducing gender inequality in education among 
the overall population over the age of 15; for example, the ratio of female to male average 
years of schooling increased from around 62.5% in 1950 to 81.2% in 1990 and 85.9% by 
2010 (Barro and Lee, 2010). This situation has an impact on land use and food security as 
education is a necessary, though not sufficient, driving force for alleviating hunger and 
poverty. Better education levels can facilitate social and technological change.
More generally, women’s participation in the labour force is significantly less compared 
to men; women have substantially lower salaries for the same type of work and a higher 
percentage of women are employed in vulnerable or irregular jobs. In no country do women 
have the same opportunities as men to participate in economic and social decision-making 
processes. In agriculture, the population is ageing and increasingly feminized as men migrate 
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for longer periods and for further destinations. Data must be considered with caution but 
FAO estimated that in 2010, 43% of the workforce in agriculture was feminine. There are 
however large differences between countries, and the share of women’ employment in 
agriculture varies from crop to crop, from activity to activity and from age group to age 
group (de Schutter, 2013). Women are often farm workers and sometimes independent 
food producers, and they face then different kinds of issues (de Schutter, 2013).
❚❚ Importance of culture in land use and food consumption
The importance of culture in land use has been widely recognized thanks to the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005b) which posits that “people are integral parts of 
ecosystems and that a dynamic interaction exists between them and other parts of 
ecosystems, with the changing human condition driving, both directly and indirectly, 
changes in ecosystems and thereby causing changes in human well-being”. A number of 
the Millennium Ecosystem sub-global assessments found that human cultures, knowledge 
systems, religions and social interactions have been strongly influenced by ecosystems; 
how societies and individuals organize landscapes, production and consumption are also 
influenced by behavioural factors related to culture, ethics and values. The International 
Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) 
(McIntyre et al., 2009) has played a major role in the assessment of the importance of local 
and traditional knowledge in agriculture. Local, traditional and indigenous communities are 
increasingly recognized as a reservoir of knowledge about agricultural practices and diets.
Future global contexts in 2050
The general purpose of the narratives about the political, economic and social 
contexts is to provide broad descriptions of future conditions that will indirectly but 
strongly impact the land use and food security system. Five hypotheses have been built 
and their main characteristics are presented in Table 6.1. Each column in Table 6.1 describes 
one hypothesis for the global context in 2050, which is a combination of assumptions of 
change in the three identified forces: governance, economic development and resources, 
and human development. Below are very brief narratives for each hypothesis. They appear 
in greater detail in the section ’How did we get there?’ of the narratives of the Agrimonde-
Terra scenarios (Chapter 13).
As far as demography is concerned, Agrimonde-Terra adopted the same assumption for all 
hypotheses for the global context in 2050. Based on the median projection provided by the 
United Nations (2015 revision), it is assumed that the world population will reach 9.7 billion 
people in 2050. The situation between 2010 and 2050 will vary in each region: stability in the 
European Union, Former Soviet Union and China; strong increases in West Africa, and in East, 
Central and South Africa (+192% and +155%, respectively), in North Africa and the Near and 
Middle East (+72% and +70%, respectively), and to a lesser extent in India (+45%) (Chapter 14).
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When a foresight exercise on land use and food security is carried out at a regional, 
national or territorial scale, assumptions about governance, economic development and 
resources, and human development should also be built at the scale that is considered.
❚❚ Hypothesis 1: Sustainable and cooperative world
There is a major rupture in this hypothesis: a change in the attitudes of institutions 
and individuals which leads to cooperation towards sustainability. States cooperate 
amongst themselves and with businesses, civil society organizations and international 
institutions and they all make strong commitments towards the mitigation of climate 
change, regulation of the nutritional quality of food products, health and a shift to a 
green and collaborative economy. Over the years, energy, climate, agriculture, logistics 
and food policies are integrated and converge. Land reforms are adopted and there is 
secure access to land for all. Policies also support the reduction of energy consumption 
and GHG emissions; they place limits on transport, improve carbon sequestration, 
encourage efficient use of inputs which are harmless for the health, advocate for 
consumer restraint and are people-centred. In developing countries, with technology 
transfer, technical assistance and financial resources, efficient energy production 
systems are established which generate little pollution and operate on small scales. 
Agri-food companies are committed to improving the nutritional quality of their food 
products, diversifying production and limiting their ecological footprint. Efforts are made 
to reduce losses and waste. Economic growth is moderate (in 2050, per capita GDP is 
$20,000 in 2050). Trade is liberalized but regulated through social and environmental 
norms. In developed and developing countries, research is highly participative, and 
innovation is technological, social and organizational. The fight against poverty is 
multifaceted and world inequalities are reduced.
❚❚ Hypothesis 2: Regionalization and energy transition
The major break that leads to this hypothesis is that States join and form large, supranational 
blocs to face together recurrent crises caused by climate, social and economic change, 
and to implement a ’food sovereignty and subsidiarity’ principle based on regional food 
supplies and supported by businesses and civil society organizations. Countries regroup 
by regions and globalization is abandoned.
Policies are steered towards regional issues. Each region uses its own energy resources. 
In regions with little fossil fuel, large quantities of renewable energy, especially biomass 
energy, are produced and efforts are made to reduce energy consumption. Economic 
growth is moderate (per capita GDP is $20,000) with a strong intra-regional trade. Trade 
between regions is limited. Investment in research varies according to the region. Regions 
with more limited financial resources concentrate on social innovation and on modernizing 
organizations, allowing them to remain competitive in a digital world. Within each region, 
countries network to improve education and research.
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❚❚ Hypothesis 3: Economic and political fragmentation
There are on-going trends towards this hypothesis which assumes political and economic 
fragmentation, as well as severe geostrategic tensions. Some countries have been 
in chaos for many years and their situation worsens with monetary and financial 
crises, States struggle to cope with their debt, there is the rise of nationalism in a 
few countries, unemployment and social instability are problems and international 
and regional institutions are unable to roll out coherent policies to help governments 
overcome their difficulties. International fossil energy markets are hit and access to 
energy is reduced in some regions. Crises in developed countries trigger more crises 
in emerging nations. Political instability aggravates economic difficulties and leads 
to internal conflicts in some countries. Global economic growth is low (per capita 
GDP stands at $18,000) but there are huge differences within countries and between 
countries. The informal economy is widely developed. Trade is limited to neighbouring 
countries. Education develops in an informal yet rather efficient manner through the 
exchange and sharing of experience; healthcare follows a similar trend. Groups of 
researchers and other interested stakeholders set up joint research and innovation 
projects supported by crowdfunding platforms and run by volunteer activists. Local 
communities of farmers and users of spaces gradually organize themselves to share 
and manage the use of resources.
❚❚ Hypothesis 4: Conventional development led by market forces
There are many on-going trends towards this hypothesis: a high reliance on fossil fuels 
and low level of concern for environmental issues, faith in technological progress to 
solve all problems, global markets and belief that competitive markets contribute to 
economic growth.
In this hypothesis, there is an alliance between multinational corporations, investments 
funds and international institutions to push towards this model. Economic growth 
is based on low-cost fossil fuel, and trade barriers are low. Above all, people have 
confidence in technology to overcome limited natural resources, as well as in education 
and information and communication technologies. Research focuses on industrial 
efficiency and cost reduction. The convergence of technologies allows considerable 
progress, but at the price of a number of accidents with serious effects on health and 
the environment. There are large inequalities at global and national levels. However, 
this development leads to an increasing number of environmental, health, economic 
and social catastrophes. Energy prices rise sharply as conventional oil and then gas 
resources become increasingly rare; reserves of phosphate and rare metals with low 
extraction costs are depleted. Competition over water is fierce. Public health deteriorates 
sharply due to pollution and unhealthy diets. Migrations from resource-poor countries 
to richer ones are very large.
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6. The Global Context
❚❚ Hypothesis 5: Dominance of non-State actors
The on-going trends towards this hypothesis are the globalization of the economy, the 
digitalization of relationships and the multiplication of initiatives by non-State actors such 
as NGOs, civil society organizations, philanthropic associations, faith-based organizations 
and academic institutions.
In a highly globalized world, where mobility is very common, rather than uniting around 
a national government, people tend to join groups that share common interests, thereby 
creating powerful currents of opinion. The consensus within public opinion regarding the 
main challenges and growth of the middle classes provide the foundation on which the 
power of the non-State interest groups is based. Urbanization and information technologies 
facilitate the development of multiple coalitions which are independent of national 
governments. Governments perceive their role as being organizers and coordinators 
of the ’hybrid’ coalitions of State and non-State actors that evolve according to the 
challenges concerned. Transnational interest groups have the ability to bypass national 
governments seeking to regulate their activities. They challenge traditional jurisdictions 
and regulations. The power of the networks and ad hoc coalitions raises security issues 
and generates geopolitical uncertainty, although such changes also bring greater global 
wealth. Energy production is decentralized. The economic situation of groups is dependent 
on their networking capacities, and there are large inequalities. Researchers are versatile 
and mobile; there is confidence in their capacity to find solutions to many of the challenges 
faced by the world.
Conclusion
The global context has changed drastically over the past forty years. A number of 
political, economic, social and technological trends and stakeholders are manifesting 
themselves, and opposing each other, creating major disruptions.
In the past forty years, the population has concentrated in Asia and Africa, and this 
represents a major challenge for future land uses and food security at global level and 
in these regions.
Global economic growth has been very rapid and contributed to changes in food systems 
and diets as well as major investments in agricultural research and development. Trade 
has evolved influenced by the simultaneous development of a multilateral trading system 
and the development of non-tariff trade barriers and preferential and regional trade 
agreements, and these evolutions have influenced the distribution of land uses. The pace of 
technological change has been very rapid, influencing heavily land use intensity in certain 
countries and less in others, especially in Africa and Asia. The share of agriculture in the 
economy and employment has evolved at different speed in different regions of the world.
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Global governance of land uses and food security has been promoted while there has 
been increased attention paid to national sovereignty and even recognition of governance 
of land uses at the levels of territories. Political instability and conflicts represent major 
risks for land uses and contribute to food insecurity. Large corporations are extremely 
influential and civil society organizations have become extremely active, and new alliances 
could shape the land uses and food security.
